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True or False: Trade-offs occur between social performance and financial performance
in microfinance. Conventional wisdom says true. Extending formal financial services
to poor and hard-to-reach clientele necessarily entails higher costs and lower per unit
returns and is, subsequently, harder to scale up. The trade-off inherent in this relationship
creates incentives for microfinance institutions (MFIs) to move up-market and away from
their traditional poor clientele—a phenomenon known as mission drift.

But as is often the case, conventional wisdom does not
necessarily represent reality, since it frequently draws
from personal bias and limited anecdotal experience.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the relationship
between social and financial performance is actually
more complex than imagined, and evidence exists to suggest that the relationship is not always negative. In some
cases, particularly in ones relating to social performance
management (SPM), the relationship may actually be
significantly positive.
The nature of the relationship also depends critically
on how one defines social performance. In practice, social
performance entails more than poverty outreach or poverty impact. Once we allow for a more expanded definition, it opens up possibilities in which the two can work
in concert with each other.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
Microfinance is unique among development approaches
in that it offers the potential for both massive scale and
operational sustainability. Perhaps more than any other
development or humanitarian strategy, microfinance offers
a diverse group of stakeholders a real opportunity to “do
well by doing good.” Microfinance combines the ethos
and practices of development with the ethos and practices
of capitalism to provide, potentially, hundreds of millions
of persons with vital services necessary to increase their
labor productivity, smooth consumption, manage risks
and withstand shocks, and build social capital. Or so goes
the popular thinking.
Things are, once again, a bit more complicated in
practice. One thing that appears almost certain is that
microfinance is a victim of excessive hype. Dozens of

impact studies find that microfinance does have significant and positive impacts, but they are substantially less
dramatic than those touted by enthusiastic microfinance
advocates. A realistic conclusion is that microfinance
should not be expected to end poverty any time soon;
there is simply no way that microfinance can live up to
the lofty expectations of its more zealous advocates.
On the positive side, we now know indisputably that
financial services constitute an integral component of the
livelihood and coping strategies of the poor. The poor
need and use financial services no less than do the wealthy.
Few people question the value of financial services in
general (Their benefits are well understood and well documented.), and few among the wealthy could imagine their
lives without access to financial services.
Given this, it might be argued that we do not need

to promise that microfinance will eliminate poverty; it
unnecessarily complicates the case by weighing it down
with unrealistic expectations and other rhetorical baggage.
A preferable approach in this case is to strip microfinance
of this baggage and focus instead on reaching as many
people possible in the least expensive way possible and in
the most sustainable way possible.
Following this argument, social impact may best be
achieved by building financially sustainable MFIs with
significant outreach. Large and sustainable MFIs, the logic
goes, are bound to pick up poor customers in their wider
net—more poor customers than some MFIs that exclusively target the poor. In this context, investing resources
in managing an MFI’s social performance, moreover, is at
best a benign distraction from the core business concerns
of scale and sustainability. At worst, it is a costly distrac15

tion that inappropriately diverts organizational resources,
with negative implications for scale and sustainability.
Others argue that discarding the antipoverty agenda
of microfinance entails risk. In particular, the quest for
scale and sustainability (i.e., profitability) will invariably
create pressures for MFIs to abandon their traditional
clientele to target easier-to-reach (less costly) and more
well-off (less risky and more profitable) clientele. The
result of this mission drift will be that the very persons
that MFIs were originally created to reach—the hard-toreach and poor—will once again be left without access to
formal financial services.
Indeed, as some survey the microfinance landscape,
they see unsettling portents. The industry has, by and
large, accepted the primary goal of financial sustainability
among industry mores and practices. Increasingly, MFIs are
adopting commercial business models (including transformation into profit-seeking, regulated institutions) and the
subsequent values. Donors, who tend to identify more with
the industry’s social roots, are increasingly giving way to
private investors who are unconnected to the sector’s social
roots and who tend to emphasize financial returns. These
developments, while good in certain important aspects,
will only increase the trend toward mission drift.
For those concerned about industry trends, the
antidote to mission drift is to keep the industry tethered
to its historical social moorings. This requires constant
attention to the social objectives of microfinance and,
critically, practical methods to manage social performance. Developing cost-effective measurement methods
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is, moreover, a necessary condition for creating social
transparency, which is in turn a necessary condition for
creating social accountability.

REASSESSING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
The truth probably lies between these two stylized arguments. Still, the competing perspectives on this issue
each incorporates a set of questionable assumptions. One
of the most important assumptions is that social performance is largely defined by poverty outreach or impact.
Defining Social Performance
Defining social performance in terms of poverty outreach
is both conceptually and practically inappropriate. Social
performance may include poverty outreach, but it also
need not. The Social Performance Glossary on the SEEP
Network’s Web site, for example, defines social performance as “the effective translation of an organization’s
social mission into practice. Social performance is not
just about measuring the outcomes, but also about the
actions and corrective measures that are being taken to
bring about those outcomes.” In practice, it is entirely
feasible for an MFI to have a distinct social mission that
does not include serving the poor. An MFI might, for
example, define its social mission as “to improve the
economic well-being of persons traditionally excluded
from formal financial markets” or “to create jobs and promote enhanced social status for small and medium-sized
agro-businesses.” Neither of these two mission statements
specifically mentions the poor, and both MFIs could

One thing that appears
almost certain is that
microfinance is a victim
of excessive hype.
conceivably fulfill their social missions without reaching
a single poor person.
How does the absence of reference to the poor or
to poverty in an MFI’s social mission make its social
mission less valid? It doesn’t, nor should the MFI’s social
performance be judged relative to this standard. Rather,
its social performance should be judged, and the MFI
held accountable, for performance relative to its stated
social mission.
To carry the point further, an MFI might have no
social mission. It may exist solely to earn a profit by
targeting nontraditional customers or formerly excluded
persons, or it may position itself to compete directly with
the mainstream commercial banks in certain nonpoor
market segments. It is, again, inappropriate to hold this
MFI accountable for social outcomes that are not part of
its institutional mission. This general point is important,
so it deserves emphasizing: Social performance is a broad
concept of which poverty outreach is one component—
an admittedly important component, but one component
nonetheless.
Social Performance as Core Business Activity
I now turn to the assertion that social performance is a
distraction from core business activities. Whether this is
true depends to a large extent on the mission of the MFI
in question. If the MFI claims a distinct social mission, it
is hard to see how dealing purposively with this mission
constitutes a distraction. This does not imply that the
MFI needs to devote x amount of effort to managing its
social performance, but it does imply that it needs to
devote some effort, particularly if it solicits funding on
the basis of this mission.
Even if one is committed to the concept of social
performance, MFIs historically have not been held
accountable for it for the simple reason that there was
no cost-effective way to measure it. To date, MFIs have
been able to opt out of measuring and reporting their
social performance with more or less impunity.

This is no longer, or will soon no longer be, the case,
however. Recent years have seen a number of technological innovations in measuring social performance
that overcome the cost barriers and that promise costeffective collection and reporting of social performance
information. These include development and emerging
consensus on critical social performance indicators, the
development of tools such as the social rating and social
audit, and the integration of methods borrowed from
the corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement in
the private sector.
The Business Case for Social Performance
Researchers have produced over one hundred studies
examining the empirical relationship between social and
financial performance. The findings are mixed across the
entire range of studies, but there do exist distinct trends
in the findings suggesting a significant and positive
relationship between social and financial performance.
A caveat to these studies is that they were done among private firms engaging in CSR, so the results are unlikely to
translate directly to microfinance. At the very least, they
serve to rebut any general argument that paying attention
to one’s social performance constitutes an inappropriate
and potentially dangerous diversion from the pursuit of
making money.
There are several ways to explain these positive findings.
The actual causal factors linking social and financial performance are likely a combination of them, plus other factors.
• The instrumental stakeholder theory suggests that the
satisfaction of various stakeholder groups is instrumental
for organizational financial performance.
• The stakeholder–agency theory argues that the relationship between stakeholders serves as a monitoring mechanism that prevents managers from diverting attention
from broad organizational financial goals. By addressing
and balancing the claims of multiple stakeholders, mangers can increase the efficiency of their organization’s
adaptation to external demands.
• Slack resources theory proposes that prior financial
performance is directly associated with subsequent social
performance because prior high levels of financial performance may provide the slack resources necessary to
engage in SPM.
• Firm-as-contract theory stipulates that high firm
performance results from the simultaneous coordination
and prioritization of multiple stakeholder interests, in
addition to separate satisfaction of bilateral relationships.
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Table 1: Selected Financial and Social Performance Indicators for Banks, NBFIs, and NGOs
Institution Type

Borrowers

Profit Margin

Return on Equity

Average Loan
Size / GNI per
Capita

Banks

53,922

16.7

112

8.4

91.6

NBFIs

14,345

9.1

110

5.2

65.0

NGOs

16,193

10.8

112

10.5

23.5

.org/resource_centers/socialperformance/.

may help build a positive image with customers, investors,
and suppliers. Firms with high social performance can
use social performance disclosures as one of the information signals on which stakeholders base their assessments
of firm reputation. Firms with high social performance
reputations may also improve relationships with bankers
and investors, or they may also attract better employees or
increase employees’ goodwill—all of which help improve
financial performance.
The purpose here is not to establish definitively a
positive relationship between social and financial performance but to provide sufficient evidence to establish the
empirical plausibility of this relationship. In the worst
case, there appears to be no harm to SPM, and in the best
case, there appears to be significant financial benefit.

SPM helps firms develop new internal competencies,
resources, and capabilities that become embedded in the
firm’s culture, technology, structure, and human resources.
• Within so-called high density networks, SPM
improves a firm’s competitive advantage by improving
management’s ability to weigh and address the multiple
and often competing claims of stakeholders in a fair and
rational manner.
• Where social performance is preemptive and a firm’s
environment is dynamic or complex, SPM may help build
management competencies because preventative efforts
of this nature require significant employee participation,
firm-wide coordination, and a forward-thinking management style. In such cases, SPM can help management
develop better scanning skills, internal processes, and
information systems, which in turn increase the organization’s capacity to manage external changes, turbulence,
and crisis.
• According to reputation theory, a firm’s communication with external stakeholders about social performance

Conventional Wisdom vs. Practice
How does the presumed trade-off between social and
financial performance play out in the context of microfinance? Table 1 offers preliminary evidence to suggest,
once again, that the conventional wisdom may be simplistic. It presents average figures from the April 2007 issue of
The MicroBanking Bulletin comparing end-of-year values
in 2005 for selected performance measures at commercial banks, nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), and
NGOs. NBFIs are for-profit, regulated financial institutions operating under different supervisory standards than
the commercial banks. NGOs typically operate with a
greater development, or social, focus than banks or NBFIs,
and they will tend to work with a poorer and more marginal clientele.
As expected, the commercial banks have on average
significantly more borrowers than the NGOs, confirming
that there is a trade-off between social focus and scale. In
contrast, the average loan size relative to gross national
income per capita is significantly smaller among NGOs,
confirming the conventional wisdom that NGOs tend
to work with poorer clients. (Average loan size is a very

The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP) and the Ford Foundation are spearheading a stakeholder engagement process called
the Social Performance Task Force. Their goal
is to coordinate work on social performance
assessment (SPA) and social performance
management (SPM) in the microfinance sector. Information on the Task Force and other
initiatives in social performance is available
on the Social Performance Resource Center’s
Web site: http://www.microfinancegateway
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rough proxy of poverty outreach based on the intuitive
assumption of an inverse relationship between income
and loan size.)
In terms of financial performance, however, the
conventional wisdom is not a good guide. Commercial
banks do not consistently outperform the NGOs across
the financial performance categories. Banks earn higher
profit margins on average, but NGOs earn a higher return
on equity on average; yet there is no difference between
the two in terms of financial self-sufficiency. Also, the forprofit NBFIs consistently do worse than the NGOs in all
five performance categories.
Far from showing a clear financial advantage for commercial banks, Table 1 seems to suggest that NGOs can
serve a poorer clientele while still earning returns comparable with commercial banks and superior to NBFIs.

CONCLUSION
The conventional wisdom asserts an inverse relationship between social performance and financial performance. I’ve outlined three reasons why the conventional
wisdom in this case is simplistic or even wrong. First, the
conventional wisdom largely defines social performance
in terms of poverty outreach. In practice, however, social
performance is a much broader concept of which poverty
outreach is but one dimension. A broader definition of
social performance makes evident any number of alternative scenarios in which social and financial performance
need not be in conflict and may even be complementary.
Second, the preponderance of empirical evidence
taken from the private sector points to a positive and
significant relationship between financial and social
performance. All else equal, firms that actively manage
their social performance earn higher financial returns than
otherwise. Doing social performance management, apparently, yields a variety of benefits that translate into higher
financial returns, such as improved stakeholder relations,
greater management capacity, improved internal capacities, better inter-firm communication, improved employee
relations, and enhanced reputation. While the empirical
findings in the private sector may not translate directly to
microfinance, neither is the microfinance sector so different that the findings are not relevant to it.
Third, preliminary evidence in microfinance fails to
show a systematic inverse relationship between social (or
poverty) orientation and financial performance. Overall,
microfinance NGOs perform similarly to, or better than,
commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions on
critical financial performance indicators. This evidence is

far from conclusive, but there is, at the very least, sufficient contrary examples to suggest that the relationship
between social and financial performance is by no means
set. The exact form of the relationship depends on the situation. A strong social orientation need not result in the
sacrifice of financial return. Conversely, a strong financial
orientation need not result in the sacrifice of social return.
What is the answer to the question of trade-offs
between financial and social performance? It depends on
the situation. There may be a trade-off; there may not be.
Digging a bit deeper in these numbers uncovers examples
of large, sustainable MFIs that serve more poor clients
and do so more profitably than poverty-focused MFIs
operating in the same markets. But there are also large,
sustainable MFIs serving very few poor people, fewer
than poverty-focused MFIs operating in the same markets.
There are also some very large MFIs exclusively focused on
poverty. Scale and sustainability do not guarantee poverty outreach, but a poverty focus does not rule out scale
or sustainability. Conversely, a poverty focus does not
guarantee poverty outreach; but scale and sustainability
can promote it. It is hard to generalize. A more thorough
analysis of the data might yet reveal some general trends,
but within these general trends, there are bound to be
numerous exceptions. The reader is well-advised to be
wary of simple generalizations and the simplified policy
prescriptions that might flow from them.
In any case, there is reason to believe that MFIs can
produce reasonably good financial performance even if
they target poorer or harder-to-reach clientele. It may or
may not be equal to what the MFI could earn in other
market segments, but it is neither desirable nor feasible
for every MFI to target the same market and the same
clientele. There is ample room for different MFIs to target
different market segments and, within these market segments, generate “good” financial returns.
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